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ABSTRACT 
The introduction of culture-based fisheries (CBF) in small scale irrigation systems is increasing the marginal value 
of water in rice farming. The amount of water that is used in Sri Lanka for rice farming could be utilised to generate 
more profitable non-crop economic activities such as CBF. This paper examines whether the re-allocation of water 
to more efficient, high return uses would increase the total economic welfare of farmer community. Primary data 
was  collected  from  460  rice  farmers  in  the  Kurunegala  District  and  334  fish  farming  groups  in  two  districts 
(Anuradhapura and Kurunegala) in Sri Lanka. The estimation of the value of water used for rice farming and CBF 
production  is  derived  from  the  marginal  value  product  by  estimating  stochastic  translog  frontier  production 
functions.  We  then  derive  benefit  calculations  on  the  basis  of  the  water  demand  functions  for  rice  and  CBF. 
Reducing the inefficient usage of water in rice farming by 32% increases the volume of water which can be used for 
CBF production by 53%.  This greater efficiency can increase, farmers' total net benefits by 17% per Metres/ha of 
water used for reservoir-based agriculture. But in order to achieve this benefit, it is critical to ensure the water rights 
of the multiple users of small scale irrigation systems. This paper recommends introducing a community transferable 
quota,  combined  with  co-management  of  water  resources,  to  enhance  the  welfare  of  fishing  and  farming 
communities which use small scale irrigation systems. Key words: Small scale irrigation systems, culture-based 
fisheries,  rice  farming,  co-management,  community  transferable  quota  system.  Water  re-allocation,  Community 
welfare 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite agricultural contribution to food security, income and livelihoods, the agricultural sector is responsible for 
withdrawing water for agriculture approximately 70% of all the global fresh water (Peris et al., 2008). In agriculture, 
water is allocated for on-storage economic activities (i.e., fishery) and off-storage economic activities (i.e., crop 
production).  When  allocation  of  water  is  non-profitable  in  mono-cropping,  farmers  can  engage  in  multi-crop 
production. Peris et al., (2008) found that in rice-fish integrated systems, the farmers produce 500 kg per hectare per 
one cropping season without adding any supplementary feed to the fish stock in their rice fields. This gives 65.8% 
economic return per annum from the rice fish integrated fields. Increasing water user efficiency, by incorporating 
multiple uses of fields is beneficial for a number of reasons. Rice-fish integrated field systems are successful where 
use of pesticides and fertilizer are minimal. The main benefits of rice-fish farming are related to environmental 
sustainability, system bio-diversity, farm diversification and household nutrition (Peris et al., 2008). However, due 
to the use of chemicals in rice farming, rice-fish integrated field systems are not practised in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, 
cultural reasons, such as the Buddhist philosophy which views the rearing and killing of animals as not culturally 
acceptable, also prevents the establishment of rice-fish integrated field systems. The introduction of CBF activities is 
a stock enhancement activity with technology innovation in the fisheries sector which tends to increase the marginal 
productivity of water. The same amount of water that is used for rice farming could be utilized to generate more 
profitable non-crop economic activities such as CBF. In practice, allocation of more water for rice may be accepted 
by society. However, allocating more water for CBF production is not a socially optimum answer in ongoing water 
allocation mechanism in Sri Lanka. 
Efficient water allocation has several objectives. First, efficiency and equity of water allocation can be considered. 
To do this, property rights, transaction costs and water accessibility are used as determents to compare forms of 
water allocation (Peris et al., 2008). Also, ensuring food security is a social objective of water allocation that can 
also be prioritised. Allocation of efficient volumes of water for use in rice farming means moving the water for use 
in areas with higher economic value. According to Molle & Berkoff, (2009), water is often used in economically 
less efficient, low return uses (usually agricultural). Re-allocation of water to more efficient, high return (non-
agricultural) uses would increase the total economic welfare. IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic efficiency is concerned with the amount of wealth that can be created by a given resource base (Dennis & 
Arriens, 2005). Decision making on the allocation of resources is one of the most important actions of the planning 
stage of a firm. Collective decisions  taken by groups may have an impact on individual profit maximization. This 
situation is much more crucial with common pool water resource allocation. In the context of rural agriculture, the 
investment of peasant households has trade-offs between income risks and the expected profit when they make 
allocation decisions under weak or missing institutions (Mendola, 2007).  
Productivity changes in water aim to increase the incentives of holding more water in order to allocate it for other 
more productive uses. Clearly, water allocation changes may decrease the quantity of water used for agriculture. 
However, the reduction of water in one sector, becomes an increase for another sector.  
Failures of efficient resource allocation in production or in the market mechanism generate positive or negative 
external effects. “External effects” is a confused, concept in economics and it has arisen with the absence of well-
defined property rights (Verhoef, 1999). Nevertheless, Demsetz (1967) explained that property rights are used as a 
primary  function  to  accomplish  internalization  of  externalities.  Furthermore,  there  is  a  possibility  to  solve  the 
external  problems  when  transaction  costs  are  sufficiently  small  (Coase,  1960).  Furubotn  (1972)  has  examined 
property rights analysis as a new and meaningful way to look at economic problems. Further analysis of property 
rights by Swanson (2003) has also highlighted that conservation objectives are affected by poorly defined property 
rights.  
Externalities have both efficiency and equity aspects. Nevertheless, there is no direct mechanism to measure the 
difference between the two goals of efficient resource allocation and equitable distribution of the benefits (Verhoef, 
1999). Arnason (2008) demonstrated that theoretically, a mixture of taxes and subsidies for the implementation of 
property rights could minimize the social externalities in the fisheries sector. Many studies of fisheries problems 
under various property right regimes have revealed that a lack of property rights and the inability to find solutions to 
introduce these rights were the main causes for external problems (Arnason, 2008). In this study, the production of 
CBF is not generally valued in the market system. Village societies like to produce an output that people are willing 
to put a price on (“desirables”). Or, they expect compensation to leave them with an equitable distribution among 
individuals (Gough, 1957). Lack of property rights causes externalities and the market system is only efficient if 
there are no externalities (Debreu, 1959). According to Chou (2002), social capital has mutual links with human 
capital and financial development. Absence of social capital in a situation with poorly defined property rights leads 
to resource depletion in both private and communal property regimes (Katz, 2000). Furthermore, collective action, 
property rights, local institutions, poverty and natural resources management are interconnected (Heltberg, 2000).  
Many developing countries have begun to decentralize policies and decision-making related to the development, 
public services, and the environment (Agarawal, 2001). Nevertheless, central government management of water and 
aquatic resources (e.g., fisheries) often lacks the capacity to enforce property rights and regulations on resource use 
(Ahmed  et  al.,  2004). In  addition  to  institutional  arrangements,  market  power  for  allocation  of  property  rights 
through  transferable  property  rights  is  discussed  in  the  literature  (Hahn,  1984).  Wingard  (2000)  suggests  that 
transferable quotas to the community minimize social impacts and internalize externalities rather than transfer to the 
individuals. Suitable water allocation policy reforms remain poorly understood, because of increasing competition 
for water use, water allocation has to be treated in an integrated manner, considering all purposes of water uses 
(Swanson, 2003; Renwic, 2001).  
  
ESTIMATION OF CONSUMER SURPLUS OF WATER RE-ALLOCATION 
 
To achieve the objectives related to efficient water allocation it is important to understand  how to make decisions 
about water management and allocation in its alternative uses (Peris et al., 2008). In this study, the value of water 
used for rice farming and CBF development has been derived from MVP by estimating production functions, which 
is one of the non-economic valuation methods of irrigation water (Peris et al., 2008). This estimation method is 
commonly used in areas where water rights and the water price have not yet been established (Peris et al., 2008). As 
a whole, if users cannot utilise the total water supplied by the physical environment, then there is a need to select the 
right mechanism for water management. This can be done either through demand management of water (such as IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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pricing,  technology  restrictions  and  water  use  regulations)  or  through  supply  enhancement  strategies  (such  as 
efficient structures and appropriately designed rules). However, through supply enhancement strategies new water 
cannot  be  materialised  (Griffin,  2006).  Imposing  water  pricing  was  not  a  successful  strategy  for  demand 
management of reservoir water in Sri Lanka (Samad, 2005). Therefore, re-allocation of water for more efficient 
alternatives, within the existing institutional framework, should be implemented when possible. 
The economic gains of re-allocating water were measured by estimating consumer’s surplus among competing water 
users. In the context of water, consumer surplus is the net benefits of water use to farmers after they have paid for 
their water. The price of reservoir water was estimated from the MVP of water used. The allocation of water in 
village irrigations was assumed to be sub optimal when water usage is inefficient and markets are not present. Two 
conditions  were  established  for  effective  water  re-allocation  between  rice  farming  and  CBF  production  at  the 
optimal and existing levels of TE in production: 
*   a TNB TNB              (1) 
   TNB TNB FR
 
            (2)
 
Condition one is that the total net benefits of reservoir water use at the frontier level of production (TNB*) should be 
greater  than  or  equal  to  the  total  net  benefits  of  reservoir  water  use  at  the  existing  level  of  production  (TNB
a). 
Condition two specifies that total benefits of water use at the frontier level of production for CBF(TNBF
  ) should 
be greater than or equal to the total benefits of water use at the existing level of TE in production (TNBR
 ). 
These two re-allocation conditions are further demonstrated in  Figure 1 MVP curves which are represented by R
a 
and F
a show production levels of rice and CBF at the existing level of TE respectively. R is the optimal allocation of 
water whereby
a
R W  and 
a
F W are the volumes of water optimally allocated for rice farming and CBF production. 
The area under the two curves is consumer surplus of water demand for rice farmers and CBF farmers. Then: 
TNB
a = (R
a+R+λ
a) + (F
a+R+ λ
a)         (3) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by Author. 
Figure 1. Inter-sector water re-allocation. 
Similarly,  the  MVP  curves  which  are  represented  by  R*  and  F*  indicate  the  frontier  level  of  rice  and  CBF 
production respectively. F is the optimal allocation of water whereby 
*
R W  and 
*
F W  are the optimal volumes of IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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water allocation for rice farming and CBF production. The area covered by R*, F and λ* is consumer surplus for 
water demand for rice farming. The area covered by F*, F and λ* is the consumer surplus of water demand for CBF 
production. Then: 
 
TNB* = (R*+F+λ*) +(F*+F+ λ*)        (4 ) 
 
POTENTIAL GAINS FROM WATER RE ALLOCATION 
 
Most  water-related benefit estimations are based on  water demand  functions. Griffin (2006) demonstrated four 
primary mechanisms used for estimation of policy changes. They are price rationing, quantity rationing, supply 
shifting and demand shifting (Griffin, 2006). Demand shifting motivates shifts or rotations of the water demand 
curve, but in price rationing, quantity rationing policy movements occur along the demand curve. An excellent 
example  of  a  demand-reducing  policy  in  irrigation  is  providing  low  interest  loans  for  advanced  irrigation 
technologies (Griffin, 2006). Demand increasing policies are less common due to water scarcity, but in a situation 
like  the  addition  of  new  agricultural  land,  commercial  enterprises,  population  growth,  economic  development, 
demand increases naturally even without policy. 
In the re-allocation of reservoir water, for efficient alternatives to materialise as a policy, maximum net benefits 
(welfare) to the society have to be estimated. Hence, the empirical approach to policy analysis is to measure the 
monetary values of efficient allocation compared to the monetary value of proposed new costs. For this, the change 
in net benefits for rice farming and CBF production has to be calculated.  If the aggregate net benefits are positive, 
then the water re-allocation can be accepted as a useful policy for increasing water productivity of village irrigation 
systems. The condition applied for efficiency- enhancing policy is ΣΔNB > 0 (Griffin, 2006). In connection with 
welfare effects of reservoir water re-allocation two conditions are measured as in equations 1 and 2.  
Water re-allocation in VIS can be estimated under the policy option of demand shifting. Removing inefficient use of 
water in rice farming is the main factor for the demand shift. Consequently, MVP of water is increased by three 
times at the optimal allocation of water in the frontier level of production. This huge increase is due to the relative 
price between rice and CBF fish
1.   
 
Figure2. Farmers’ welfare benefits of reservoir water re-allocation 
Figures  2.a  and  2.b  show  the  welfare  effects  of  reservoir  water  re-allocation  of  rice  and  CBF  production 
respectively. The area which represents the welfare effects of the existing level and the frontier level of production 
are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Analysis of demand shifting due to water re-llocation 
Farmers’ Wealfare  Rice 
fFarming 
CBF 
production 
Total welfare  
Farmer welfare at existing production levels 
Farmer welfare at frontier level 
Total farmer welfare 
A 
B 
A+B 
C 
D 
C+D 
A+C 
B+D 
(A+C)+(B+D) 
Net welfare effect of water re-allocation  (A+C)+(B+D) 
 
Demand increases due to water re-allocation, changes the volume of water used in two ways. The welfare effects 
that existed before re-allocation of rice farming are shown in area A of Figure 2a. Area B shows post re-allocation 
welfare effects. In the context of rice farming, water demand decreases by approximately 70% at the frontier level of 
production. This is because of inelastic demand for water at the frontier level. This means that inefficient volumes of 
water is one of the determinants of the elasticity of water demand for rice farming. 
The illustrative Figure 2.b is associated with CBF production. The areas, C and D show the welfare effects of water 
before re-allocation and post allocation. With the increase of water demand, the volume of water is increased by 
approximately by 32%. This is because the residual volume of water is increased with optimal water allocation (re-
allocation) in the reservoirs. Therefore, removing inefficient usage of water in rice farming increases the volume of 
water which can be used for CBF production. This means that farmers’ TNB increases by LKR 21553 for M/ha of 
water used for reservoir based agriculture. This effect is shown in Table 2 which illustrates the details of estimation 
of community welfare.  
Table 2.Consumer surpluses for rice and CBF production with water re-allocation 
Production types  Consumer surplus for water demand  Changes of consumer surplus with 
water re-allocation 
Existing level  Frontier level 
Rice farming 
CBF production 
Total surplus 
38756 
-20318 
18438 
-26712 
250880 
3116 
120443 
9510 
21553 
 
With the re-allocation of water, net MVP is positive. This estimation is shown in both existing and frontier levels of 
production. 
  
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH RESERVOIR WATER RE -ALLOCATION  
 
According to the analysis of total benefits of water re-allocation, it is possible to make three possible conclusions:  
(i)  Increases in TE of current water use is essential in order to save water in the VIS.  
(ii)  The  total  marginal  value  product  (benefits)  of  a  reservoir  can  be  increased  by  three  times. 
Consequently, farmers’ welfare is increased.  IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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(iii)  Increasing the total reservoir water productivity and farmers’ welfare are mainly attributed to the 
marginal value water productivity of CBF production. Therefore, promoting CBF activities is an 
incentive to efficient use of water in VIS. 
Clearly, water must be re-allocated between rice farming and CBF production in order to achieve higher level of 
reservoir water productivity. Zhou et al., (2009) have revealed that water re-allocation also has impacts on crop 
production and farmers income in the larger irrigation system. They further revealed that water re-allocation from 
upstream to downstream areas has reduced agricultural water supply and the area irrigated. There are two key issues 
which are associated with the water re-allocation: (i) establishing water user rights among the farmers (rice and 
CBF) and (ii) the establishment of a mechanism to internalise CBF externalities, which are generated by the unequal 
distribution of the benefits that arise from CBF production. These two factors are discussed in detail in the next two 
subsections.  
ESTABLISHING WATER USER RIGHTS 
The  interdisciplinary  nature  of  problems  associated  with  water  resource  use  needs  be  integrated  into  an 
environmental, technical, social, economic and legal framework. However, introducing any management system for 
water resources with poorly defined property rights is likely to generate externalities which impose indirect costs or 
benefits to water users and the environment, leading to an inefficient allocation (Heaney & Beare, 2001).  
The subject of water  rights is receiving increasing attention from policy makers due to the growing understanding  
that ill-defined water user rights impairs efficient use because it creates high transaction costs (information search 
costs, negotiation and  monitoring) on decision making on water use (Wichelns, 2004). The main cost of collective 
decision-making reviewed in the economic literature are the so called transaction costs. Transaction costs are those 
costs of collective agreement decisions or the costs of making decisions. One of the determinants of the transaction 
cost is the group size which is involved in decision making. There is a large amount of literature that discuses the 
effect of group size on net benefits to the group. The early literature (Olsen, 1962) argues that small groups are less 
likely  to  be  suitable.  By  contrast,  one  of  the  disadvantages  of  large  groups  is  the  difficulty  of  reaching  any 
agreement. Hence large groups are less likely to contribute to collective decision making than small groups (Oliver, 
1998). In the case of CBF production in a VIS it has been found that CBF activities organised by small groups have  
a  positive  relationship  with  the  fish  yield  (Kularatne  et  al.,  2009)  and  such  groups  are  the  most  successful  in 
providing benefits to participants (Senaratne & Karunanayake, 2006). Senaratne and Karunanayake (2006) further 
revealed that large groups have higher information costs (9%), but less enforcement and monitoring costs (78%) 
compared to small groups (90%) in CBF production. In the case of a single private owner, the transaction costs are 
assumed to be zero. CBF activities under private owners are minimal in village irrigation because of water sharing 
issues.  However,  reservoir  water  is  a  common  pool  resource,  where  more  than  one  user  is  involved,  so  the 
transaction costs are likely to be positive (Senanayake & Karunanayake, 2006). Low transaction costs have been 
linked to less conflict ridden groups, where agreement is naturally easier to reach. Access exclusion costs are the 
costs of preventing outsiders from using the resource. In principle, it could be argued that access exclusion costs are 
likely to be the same for different types of management regimes. However, in CBF production, access exclusion 
costs of FOs in large groups are less than small groups (Senanayake & Karunanayake, 2006). Nevertheless, it could 
be argued that for a fixed size of a resource, a larger group implies more individuals are involved in monitoring, so 
exclusion costs may be lower with common pool resources. Similar arguments arise with regard to enforcing rules 
about  how  group  members  or  “insiders”  use  the  resource.  A  second  cause  of  the  decline  of  village  irrigation 
management  is  the  declining  productivity  compared  to  alternative  income  sources.  This  arises  when  the  total 
economic gains from collective management are less than the costs. A case study in South Africa revealed that 
small-scale  farmers  are  prepared  to  pay  a  higher  price  for  improvement  of  water  right  systems  while  lower 
institutional trust and income levels lead to lower willingness to pay (Speelman et al., 2010). Similarly, FOs with 
medium sized groups of farmers (30-40 members) and economically homogenous members are better for irrigation 
water management (Thiruchelvam, 2010). 
INTERNALISING CBF EXTERNALITIES 
One of the main outcomes of the welfare effects of the inter-sectoral allocation of reservoir water is increasing 
village community welfare mainly attributed to increasing CBF production. The recent trend of CBF development in 
Sri Lanka can be identified as transformation of a common pool resource (village reservoir) into private property IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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(for a small group of farmers). With subsidises for CBF activities (i.e., subsidised fingering supply) reservoirs are 
facing problems linked to tragedy of the commons documented by Hardin (1968).  
In frontier level CBF production, a technically efficient solution has been estimated. However, this estimate may not 
be enough to argue that on a frontier level production is the most socially efficient solution. This is simply because 
of the unequal distribution of the CBF benefits among the other water users. The farmers who have no access to 
CBF production may receive neither private benefits nor compensation for the cost of water allocation for CBF 
production. Some of the costs arising from CBF development are the combination of other water uses (especially 
domestic  use:  bathing,  washing  clothes  in  the  water  deficit  period).  A  key  aspect  of  CBF  development  is 
capitalization,  which  can  lead  to  overcapitalisation  with  increasing  profit  margins  of  CBF  farmers.  However, 
application of an individual fishing quota system (IFQ) or individual transferable quota (ITQ) system
2 on CBF 
resources allocation may not be practical (Arnoson, 2009; Wingard, 2000) as the reservoir water is a common pool 
regime. Therefore, rather than allocating a transferable quota to individuals, allocating them into communities may 
capture the benefits of CBF, while minimizing the social impact and internalising externalities of CBF production. 
In the next section, details will be provided on the applicability of community transferable quota systems (CTQs) 
rather than allocating CBF activities individually or to a selected small group of farmers (Wingard, 2000). 
As a whole, society will benefit when resources are used efficiently. With overcapitalisation, resources tend to get 
wasted due to overuse. Therefore, property rights are considered as the best way to achieve the most efficient use of 
the resources. Having a private property rights on resources ensure that the benefits of investment will be received 
by the investor. Some economists (Arnason, 2009; 2005) argue that the ITQs must generate economically optimal 
results, but it is a self-centred utility maximizing Homo economics practice  described in neoclassical economic 
theory (Wingard, 2000). Especially in the case of CBF production where the allocation of an ITQ system makes 
entry into the fishery more difficult: some reservoirs accommodate all farmers in the FO in the CBF group in a 
particular culture cycle. There should be a mechanism which fulfils sustained participation of communities in CBF 
activities,  which  will  minimise  adverse  economic  impacts  on  such  communities.  For  this  reason,  CTQs  could 
accomplish many of the economic and biological goals, while minimising negative social impacts (Wingard, 2000).  
Community level agricultural management is very common in Asia. Furthermore, community fisheries management 
is widespread in many non-industrialised societies (Wingard, 2000). The CTQs have many potential advantages for 
addressing social shortcomings of efficiency. Under a CTQ system, a large number of people would be able to 
remain in the fishery at least on a culture-cycle basis.  
 
CTQs of CBF production 
 
Under a CTQ system for CBF, a group of farmers would be able to get involved in CBF activities based on a 
culture-cycle. Groups of farmers for CBF could be selected among the farmers who are willing to get involved in 
CBF activities. This may determine the total number of farmers in the group. Under a CTQ system, there are two 
factors which may maximize the economic benefits while minimizing cost impacts: 
(i)  If  the  group  of  farmers  is  considerably  large  (small  group  favours  group  stability),  they  can  be  given  a 
community quota on the basis of the culture cycle. The total group can be divided up into smaller groups.  
Group  one  could  be  given  an  opportunity  in  first  culture  cycle  and  the  second  group  could  be  given  an 
opportunity in the next cycle and so on. This system could be rotated for each consecutive culture- cycle. 
(ii)  Depending on the spatial MVP of rice farming, one group of farmers with higher MVP of rice farming could 
cultivate rice, while others who have a lower value of MVP could become involved in CBF, especially during 
the share cropping seasons. 
Selected communities (group of farmers) would provide access rotationally. This would contribute to maintaining 
and improving social and economic stability and would avoid economic dependency
3 of the whole communities on 
one form of production. Social capital which is a valuable asset in the context of a village community could be 
further strengthened through economic independence. In addition to communal stability, other sectors of the rural 
economy such as agriculture and livestock
4 would also benefit. This would also strengthen social capital throughout 
the village community. Social capital exists with the form of obligation, expectation and trust (Teraji, 2008; Grafton, 
2005). Obligation and trust help farmers to meet their goals. Information is another form of social capital which 
reduces the uncertainty of CBF production. Norms and sanctions are also part of the social capital. They allow for IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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predictability of behaviour which reduces transaction costs (Grafton, 2005; Coleman, 1988). Improvement of social 
capital may lead to communal stability and would contribute to the long term social and economic wellbeing of 
village communities. 
Co-management as a mechanism for water re-allocation 
Social capital plays an important role in enhancing trust and co-operation which would reduce the misuse of the 
available resources among the resource users (Grafton, 2005). As Teraji (2008) has stated, a fully protected property 
rights system can achieve a higher level of trust, while unguaranteed property rights will remain at a low level. 
Therefore, property rights play an important role in establishing the trust and social capital among communities by 
increasing cooperation among the resource users. Benefits of cooperation include the avoided costs of social conflict 
and avoided externalities imposed by others. Wade (1987, p.98) states that the “Main factor explaining the presence 
or absence of collective organisation is the net collective benefit of the action.” More specifically, Wade (1987) 
focuses avoiding external costs through cooperation. He argues that cooperation occurs in villagers where the net 
benefits of cooperation are highest. Since the relative transaction and exclusion costs will be similar for each village, 
the main cost is the relative benefits of cooperation or the avoided external costs of non-cooperation. The benefits of 
cooperation  are  highest  and  costs  are  lowest  when  benefits  are  equally  distributed  to  all  groups  gained  from 
collective management. This is often violated in the case of large irrigation systems where some farmers are much 
closer to the water source (head-enders) while other groups are much further away (tail enders). Cooperation is 
unlikely  to  work  where  the  group  contains  both  head-enders  and  tail-enders  since  head-enders  lose  out  as 
cooperation  increases  and  their  water  use  is  limited.  Therefore,  from  a  social  capital  point  of  view,  it  can  be 
suggested that current top-down resource management should be redirected towards a ‘co-management’ approach 
(Grafton, 2005).  
It has been shown in many parts of the world that co-management and community-based management of natural 
resources could provide effective alternatives for natural resources management (Hannesson, 1998; Ostrom, 1990; 
Wade, 1987). Current research suggests that there are emerging characteristics which are central to developing and 
sustaining institutions that support successful co-management arrangements. Ostrom (1990) and Pinkerton (1989) 
have summarized and documented some of those key conditions necessary to maintain successful co-management 
institutions. From their work, co-management is likely to succeed in resource systems where boundaries are clearly 
defined, membership is clearly defined, the user group is cohesive, the user group has prior experience with the 
organization, and the benefits of management exceed costs. Additional criteria are that there will be participation in 
management  by  those  who  are  affected,  due  to  the  enforcement  of  management  rules  under  which  these  co-
management approaches are enforced. Also the user group has legal rights to organize, so that there is co-operation 
and leadership at the community level. Furthermore, there is decentralization and delegation of authority, and there 
is co-ordination between the government and the community. 
In Sri Lanka, the inland fisheries development programme came to a standstill with the decision of the government 
to terminate state patronage in 1990, on religious grounds for this important sector which had been contributing 20% 
to the total fish production in the country. This government policy decision has been reversed and since 1994, 
development of Inland Fisheries and Aquaculture has been given high priority because of its value as a cheap animal 
protein for the rural community (Amarasinghe, 1998). It also has the potential to increase income and employment 
opportunities to the people and to function as a source of foreign exchange to the country (Sivasubramaniam & 
Jayasekara, 1997) . 
After  withdrawal  of  state  support  for  inland  fisheries  development,  annual  inland  fish  production  declined 
dramatically. This decline was shown to be a result of "growth over- fishing" (Amarasinghe & De Silva, 1999). This 
resulted  due  to  the  use  of  small  mesh  gillnets  in  the  absence  of  state-sponsored  monitoring  procedures.  This 
indicates that under the existing state management procedure, it is necessary to have a Centralized Management 
Authority  for  Inland  Fisheries  management  in  Sri  Lanka  (Amarasinghe  &  De  Silva,  1999).  In  reservoirs  with 
‘organized’ fishing, the communities themselves have developed regulations through community based management 
strategies. In such reservoirs overexploitation of fish stocks was not evident even after state-sponsored monitoring 
procedures were suspended (Amarasinghe & De Silva, 1999).  
Based on these studies, an alternative approach is recommended for the management of reservoir capture fisheries in 
Sri Lanka. It is recommended that Government and resource-users have equal responsibilities in making decisions IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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for  the  management  of  reservoir  fisheries  (Amarasinghe,  1998).  This  acknowledges  the  fact  that  farmers’ 
involvement is equally important for the successful co-management system as primary stakeholders.  
It has been found that participation rates for collective action (FO activities) are a positive factor for increasing TE 
in rice and CBF production in the case of reservoir based irrigation in Sri Lanka. However, recent studies on major, 
medium and minor irrigation systems in the Kurunagala and Anuradhapura districts of Sri Lanka have found that 
participation  rates  for  FO  activities  is  38%  because  of  lack  of  accountability  and  transparency  of    FOs 
(Thiruchelvam, 2010). As a result, Thiruchelvam (2010) recommended establishing strong linkages between FOs 
(primary level stake holders) and water authorities (responsible institutions) for successful irrigation management. 
According to Khalkheili & Zamani, (2009), the establishment of co-operation with water authority operators will 
enhance farmers’ participation in irrigation management. Furthermore, co-management practices should promote 
active involvement of immediate actors to the resources for their management rather than relying on institutional 
hierarchy.  
Markets are another supplementary factor in the co-management of VIS. Rice production is more popular than the 
CBF  production  at  village  level.  However,  part  of  the  production  of  rice  is  marketed  by  farmers  since  rice 
cultivation is also an income generating activity. CBF on the other hand is mainly produced for the market. Hence, 
allocating irrigation water has to take into account the market behaviour of these goods. The value of the water may 
depend  on  MVP  t.  Therefore,  essentially  in  addition  to  institutions  and  primary  level  resource  uses,  market 
motivation is another factor that should be considered in the decision making process of reservoir water allocation. 
There is a possibility for all farmers in the village to be represented in FOs. Village farmers and the village level 
agriculture  and  fisheries  officers,  who  represent  institutions,  are  identified  as  primary  level  actors.  The  FOs 
represents the farmers’ while ARPAs and AEO who are represented the government officials. Bidirectional arrows 
in Figure 3 show the necessary direction of trust and cooperation. Based on the strength of these two institutions and 
the power of decision-making, it will be possible to implement a successful co-management strategy with water re-
allocation. Finally, it can be concluded that the combination of sharing responsibility of water management, between 
responsible  institutions  and  primary  level  stakeholders,  with  the  motivation  of  the  market  forces  for  profitable 
alternative water uses, is a practicable mechanism for reservoir-based irrigation water management which can be 
achieved for efficient output and higher MVP of water in VIS. 
  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Policies are considered as alternative institutions (Griffin, 2006). Water re-allocation aims to allocate water for 
enhancement of the total reservoir water productivity. The preceding analysis of MVP of water shows that the 
optimal allocation of water between rice and CBF production enables increases in reservoir  water productivity. 
However, the main constraints are lack of well-defined water user rights for CBF production and the non-existence 
of transferability of water uses of rice farming for other beneficial water user alternatives. Most of the issues relating 
to the enhancement of water productivity must be dealt with using the existing WUAs s (i.e. FOs) on an apolitical 
basis. Co-management of the water resources is the most appropriate mechanism that can be recommended where a 
combination of both farmers and formal institutions would share the management responsibilities in the market 
environment.  
Sanctions for the non-cooperation in an irrigation system are difficult, but possible. The common irrigation service 
is not a pure public good, because one contributor can, with difficulty, be excluded. Even when punishment by 
exclusion is difficult, it is possible to impose fines. There are rules that are already implemented that arise from crop 
destruction by animals. Owners of animals are required to pay the cost of the crops damaged by animals. Another 
example, where collective management is involved takes place when making decisions about allocation. In this 
instance, those who do not participate lose out.  This can discourage free-riding in attending FO meetings. In some 
irrigation systems in Sri Lanka, non participation or free riding by individuals has led to penalties (Uphoff et al., 
1990). 
Established  water  user  rights  and  transferable  water  user  rights  must  be  initiated  at  the  existing  village  level 
institutions (FOs). The Ministry of Agrarian services and Fisheries and Aquatic Resources should formulate relevant 
policies for further strengthening relevant institutions. The responsible legal body for solving water allocation issues 
with FOs is DAD network. NAQDA should facilitate the technical aspects of CBF production. Collaboration of 
these two institutions with FOs would considerably improve collective action of farmers and would advance the co-IIFET 2012 Tanzania Proceedings 
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management strategy further. Selection of  CBF farmers for  CBF production in particular village irrigations can 
cope with re-introduction of a CTQs which has already been practiced in rice farming known as a Thattumarau
5 
system. Thattumaru system can be successfully used for selection of CBF farmers without introducing new selection 
criteria as it is inherently practiced by village farmers. However, There are two main limitations of the study: MVP 
analysis does not undertake more than two sectors of water uses (rice farming and CBF production), while reservoir 
water is being used for many other uses such as domestic use, animal watering and brick making. However, any 
steps which are taken to increase the residual volume of water will be beneficial for all the other alternative uses. In 
practice TE may not be possible to increase by one cropping seasons or a culture cycle for rice and CBF production 
respectively. The important factor for policy makers is realising that the maximum level of TE should be achieved to 
obtain  the  maximum  benefits.  In  other  words,  optimal  allocation  of  water  should  occur  to  improve  TE.  This 
enhancement can happen in three ways. First, TE of rice farming can increase while TE of CBF production is in 
existing level of production. Second, TE of CBF production can increase while TE of rice production is at existing 
levels  of  production.  Third,  the  TE  of  both  sectors  can  be  increased  at  the  existing  level  of  production.  The 
investigation of the dynamic situation of TE and its impact on optimal allocation is an area that could be examined 
further.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Reservoir water productivity can be increased by five times, by increasing TE up to the frontier level of production. 
The  only  necessary  requirement  for  water  saving  is  that  water  is  used  efficiently  in  rice  farming.    Increasing 
reservoir water productivity should be undertaken from a practical point of view. It should ensure water user rights 
of VISs for multiple users. It is important to reintroduce CTQs in CBF production in order to select CBF farmers. 
Co-management  of  water  resources  is  the  best  institution  for  reservoir  water  management.  Increasing  farmers’ 
economic  benefits  through  efficient  water  re-allocation  in  reservoir-based  agriculture  will  remove  village 
dependency on external sources (subsidy, political support). The FOs can act as the main village level institution for 
reservoir water management and decision-making, with the support of relevant formal institutions and the market 
guidance of reservoir water demand. 
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End notes: 
 
1.  Average prices for paddy and fish are LKR 30.00 and 100 per kg respectively. 
 
2.  An ITQ is a quota share individual allocated as privilege of the total annual fish catch.  Quota shares determined 
how the total annual fish catch is to be subdivided into individual fishermen. ITQs are usually allocated to 
individuals and group of fishermen during some designated period of time. ITQ shares can be transferred to other 
parties (Wingard, 2002). 
 
3. FOs are highly politisised due to economic inter-dependence on the politicians and other people (money lenders). 
This dependency can be removed by increasing water user efficiency.  The CBF farmers paid 5% to 15% of the 
total income of CBF production in 2009. However this is entirely a decision made by the individual FOs in the 
kanna meeting. This system can be further improved  and formalized under CTQs with well defined property 
rights of  intra-sector water allocation. 
  
 4. The inefficient sector of the command area could be used for cattle grazing which will generate positive 
externalities for CBF development of downstream reservoirs of the cascade. 
 
5. Thattumaru is the rotational cultivation of one plot of land by several children within one household. One of the 
children cultivates the entire plot for one season, the next season another son / daughter will cultivate the entire 
plot, etc.  